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potential debate about behavioral experiments in health. By doing so, the different streams and 
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and the scope for the further development of behavioral experiments in health in the years to 
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Introduction 
 
In the last decades, experiments have been successfully introduced in many fields of 
economics, such as industrial organization (e.g. Chamberlain, 1948; Sauermann and Selten, 
1959; Plott, 1982), labor economics (e.g. Kagel, Battalio, Rachlin, and Green, 1981; Fehr, 
Kirchsteiger, and Riedl, 1993), or public economics (e.g. Marwell and Ames, 1981; Bohm, 
1984; Andreoni, 1988). Despite the fact that the use of experiments was first advocated by 
leading health economists a long ago (Fuchs, 2000; Frank, 2007; Newhouse, Manning, Morris, 
Orr, Duan, Keeler, Leibowitz, Marquis, Marquis, Phelps, and Brook, 1981), their introduction 
and employment has been relatively slow to be widely accepted in health economics, policy, 
and management. 
 
Recently, however, two special issues in the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 
(Cox, Green, and Hennig-Schmidt, 2016) and in Health Economics (Galizzi and Wiesen, 
forthcoming), and a number of dedicated special sessions in major field conferences (e.g. 
EuHEA, iHEA) indicate the increasing acceptance of experiments by the health economics, 
policy, and management communities. 
 
The rise in interest in using experiments in health economics has coincided with the parallel 
growing interest in applying behavioral economics to health, as witnessed by an increasing 
number of books and articles on the topic (Roberto and Kavachi, 2015; Bickel, Moody, and 
Higgins, 2016; Hanoch, Barnes, and Rice, 2017; Loewenstein, Schwartz, Ericson, Kessler, 
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Bhargava, Hagmann, Blumenthal-Barby, D’Aunno, Handel, Kolstad, Nussbaum, Shaffer, 
Skinner, Ubel, and Zikmund-Fisher, 2017).  
 
Among health policy-makers and practitioners, the use of insights from behavioral economics, 
and, in particular, of “nudges” has recently led many governments around the world to set up 
behavioral or “nudge units” within their civil services, starting from the Behavioural Insights 
Team in the UK Cabinet Office, to the analogous initiatives within the UK Department of 
Health, the NHS, and Public Health England, in the governments of Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, 
the US, and in the European Commission (Sunstein, 2011; Dolan and Galizzi, 2014a; Oliver, 
2017).  
 
We start with a simple operational definition of “behavioral experiments in health”, arguably 
the first such a definition. We then identify ten key areas of potential debate about behavioral 
experiments in health, which we think deserve explicit discussion. In what follows, we address 
one by one each of these ten areas of possible debate and controversy by answering ten 
corresponding questions. By doing so, we review the state of the art of the different streams 
and areas of applications of the growing field of behavioral experiments in health; we discuss 
which significant questions remain to be discussed; and we highlight the rationale and the scope 
for the further development of behavioral experiments in health in the years to come.  
 
In a nutshell, “behavioral experiments in health” make use of a broad range of experimental 
methods typical of experimental and behavioral economics to investigate individual and 
organizational behaviors and decisions related to health and healthcare.  
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The behaviors and decisions considered in behavioral experiments in health therefore usually 
take place, or are framed, in a health, healthcare, or medical setting or context.  
 
The term “behavioral” in “behavioral experiments in health” requires a first clarification. 
Common to experimental economics and behavioral science, in fact, the outcomes of 
behavioral experiments in health are “behavioral” in that they consist of directly observable 
and measurable behavioral responses or directly revealed preferences, rather than self-reported 
statements. For example, subjects in behavioral experiments in health are typically observed in 
real health or healthcare field situations, or, if not, they face real consequences for their choices 
or behaviors through aligned monetary and non-monetary incentives. Behaviors and decisions 
of participants to a behavioral experiment in health are thus typically “natural” – that is they 
take place in naturalistic situations - or “incentive-compatible” in the usual experimental 
economics sense that participants bear some real behavioral consequences for their choices in 
the experiment (e.g., Smith, 1976, 1982; Friedman and Sunder, 1994; Cassar and Friedman, 
2004). This defining feature makes behavioral experiments in health distinct from “stated 
preference experiments”, such as contingent valuation studies, or “discrete choice 
experiments” (DCEs), which have since long been used in health economics, and which do not 
typically consider real behavior or incentive-compatible choice situations (e.g., Ryan, 
McIntosh, and Shackley, 1998; Ryan and Farrar, 2000; de Bekker-Grob, Ryan, and Gerard, 
2012). 
 
Furthermore, methodologically, behavioral experiments in health purportedly cover the entire 
continuum spectrum of experimental methods spanning the lab to the field, passing through 
online and mobile experiments, and experiments pursuing “behavioral data linking” (for more, 
see questions 3 and 10).  
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Finally, and following the usual methodological convention in experimental economics, 
behavioral experiments in health do not deceive subjects. Some behavioral experiments in 
health can, nonetheless, entail some degree of “obfuscation” when, in the attempt to minimize 
possible “experimenter demand effects” (Zizzo, 2010), subjects are not told about the exact 
purpose and research question of the experiment. This is in line with the spirit of those 
experiments that intend to minimize the alteration of, and interference with, naturally occurring 
behavior by not telling subjects that they are part of an experiment (that is, in the spirit of 
“natural field experiments” according to the taxonomy by Harrison and List, 2004, discussed 
in question 3; or of “lab-field” experiments as in Dolan and Galizzi, 2014a).  
 
To sum up, five characterizing features of behavioral experiments in health are therefore: (i) 
the fact that the decisions and behaviors are health-related; (ii) the fact that, whenever possible, 
the outcomes of the decisions in the experiment are “behavioral” in the sense of consisting of 
directly observable and measurable behavioral responses, or of bearing real consequences for 
the decision-makers; (iii) the open-minded consideration of principles and insights from both 
behavioral economics and conventional economics, as well as their combination and 
integration; (iv) the use of a broad range of experiments spanning the lab to the field, passing 
through online and mobile experiments, and “behavioral data linking” experiments; and (v) the 
tendency to avoid deception which, however, does not prevent the use of obfuscation, natural 
field experiments, and lab-field experiments.  
 
We next review the existing literature by addressing ten areas of current debate about 
behavioral experiments in health. A few of these areas apply to behavioral experiments more 
generally and, when this is the case, we explicitly notice this. 
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Question 1: What can behavioral experiments tell us that non-experimental methods in 
health cannot tell us already? 
 
First of all, theory, experiments, and econometrics are complements, not substitutes, to each 
other (Falk and Heckman, 2009; Harrison, Lau and Rutström, 2015; Galizzi, Harrison, and 
Miraldo, 2017). In particular, the way in which behavioral experiments are sometimes 
contrasted with econometric analysis is misleading. In fact, running any type of controlled 
behavioral experiments in health (see more in question 3) is just the first step of the data 
collection process that should then feed into an appropriate econometric analysis of the 
experimental data. The broad range of behavioral experiments in health allows the researcher 
to gather rich data to delve empirically into the behavioral nuances and mechanisms of an 
observed change in health-related behavior. Indeed, as witnessed by the field of “behavioral 
econometrics”, experiments and econometric analysis are complementary, not substitute, 
methods (Hey and Orme, 1994; Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström, 2008a, 2010, 2014; 
Harrison, Lau and Rutström, 2015). A similar point holds for the theoretical underpinnings of 
a behavioral experiment in health.  
 
Second, a key advantage of behavioral experiments is the ability to tightly control experimental 
conditions. In physics and social sciences, testing theory is a basic component of experiments 
and the scientific method relies upon explicit tests of theory (Charness and Kuhn, 2011; 
Charness and Fehr, 2015). While secondary data are often rich and abundant, at the same time 
they might be confounded by a variety of environmental factors. For example, a health 
economist who pursues to test the effect of incentives inherent in performance pay on the 
physicians’ quality of medical care using secondary data might end up with confounded results 
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because institutions such as public monitoring and reporting of physicians’ quality was 
introduced at the same time. Using secondary data, disentangling these factors seems 
prohibitively challenging, if not impossible. Taking a more general perspective, the key 
strength of behavioral experiments is the ability to test a specific theoretical model. One can 
then compare the behavioral predictions of the model to what happens. If a specific theory is 
rejected it is then relatively neat to test competing explanations. For example, rational decision-
making theory might not be suitable to explain the inconsistent choices of insurance plans in 
the US (e.g., Abaluck and Gruber, 2011). Competing behavioral decision-making theories 
might then be called upon whose alternative explanations can then be tested in controlled 
experiments. This is consistent with the open-minded approach of behavioral experiments in 
health, which consider principles and insights from both behavioral economics and 
conventional economics. 
 
Third, another reason to run experiments is the unique opportunity to study behavior and 
practices analyzed in the theoretical health economics models that are difficult to observe using 
field data. An example is the effect of referral payments from specialists to primary care 
physicians on primary care physicians’ referral behavior. While health economic theory (e.g., 
Pauly, 1979) suggests that referral fees enhance efficiency payments for referrals are largely 
forbidden, however, in almost all Western healthcare markets. In a lab experiment, Waibel and 
Wiesen (2017) explicitly test model predictions on physicians’ diagnostic effort and referral 
decisions and find that the introduction of referral payments increase efficiency, although not 
to the levels predicted by theory. Another example is unethical behavior in health care, for 
example, diagnostic related groups (DRG) upcoding. Admittedly, at an aggregate level there is 
plenty of evidence that DRG upcoding exists (e.g., Silverman and Skinner, 2004; Jürges and 
Köberlin, 2015). However, what drives unethical behaviors is largely unknown. A study by 
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Hennig-Schmidt, Jürges, and Wiesen (2017) complements field studies on DRG upcoding by 
analyzing dishonest behavior in a framed experiment in neonatology and by linking dishonest 
behavior to individuals’ characteristics to explore what drives dishonesty. They find that audits 
and fines significantly reduce dishonest and that subjects’ personality traits and integrity relate 
to dishonest behavior. A further area in health, in which behavioral experiments have 
contributed to, is to a better understanding of the behavioral effects of professional norms. 
Exogenously changing professional norms in the field seems prohibitively challenging, and (if 
possible) drawing inferences seems difficult due to numerous confounding factors. In an online 
experiment with a large medical student sample, Kesternich, Schumacher, and Winter (2015) 
analyze the effect of making the Hippocratic oath salient on patient-regarding altruism and 
distributional preferences. In a series of experiments with physicians (from internal medicine 
and pediatrics), Ockenfels and Wiesen (2017) investigate the effect of a professional framing 
on physicians’ dishonest behavior (on behalf of themselves and others). Evidence from 
behavioral experiments in health which are “well-grounded” in theory are therefore not only 
useful to contrast behavior with model predictions but also to further stimulate the debate 
among healthcare policy-makers on practices with little or no field evidence.  
 
Fourth, one of the key strengths of experiments, in general, is that a researcher can empirically 
study the causal effects of different institutions, as defined by their rules, actors, and incentives. 
Thus, behavioral experiments seem ideal to serve as a test bed for analyzing the effect of 
institutional changes related to health care. Understanding behavioral mechanisms in health-
related decisions is imperative before designing and implementing large-scale behavioral 
interventions in the field or ad hoc healthcare policy interventions, as there might be unknown 
or unintended effects for providers and patients alike. In this sense, excluding behavioral 
experiments from the research toolkit of a health economist would be somewhat similar to 
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ignoring animal studies for medical or drug research: “while results from animal studies do not 
always apply to humans, the ability to test many hypotheses cheaply under carefully controlled 
conditions provides an indispensable tool for the development of models that work in the real 
world” (Charness and Kuhn, 2011, p.233).  
 
Fifth, behavioral results from experiments might not only be insightful to better understand 
actual health-related decision-making and behavior, but also to inform the development of 
behavioral economics theories in health contexts (e.g. Kőszegi 2003, 2006; Frank, 2007; 
Hansen, Anell, Gerdtham, and Lyttkens, 2015). The observation of actual human behavior in 
experiments enables the researcher to identify behavioral deviations from theory and thus to 
extend health economic theories by taking into account issues like human motivation, or 
behavioral phenomena like emotions or (patient-regarding) altruism. Two prominent research 
areas in which theory and experiments have already fruitfully complemented each other are: 
the matching markets for organ donations and for physicians and healthcare professionals (e.g. 
Roth, 2002; Roth and Peranson, 1999; Kessler and Roth, 2012; Kessler and Roth, 2014a,b; 
Herr and Normann, 2016; Li, Hawley and Schnier, 2013); and the design of mixed systems of 
public and private healthcare finance (e.g. Buckley, Cuff, Hurley, McLeod, Mestelman, and 
Cameron, 2012, 2016).  
 
In sum, running behavioral experiments in health allows the researcher to better understand the 
causal effects of health-related policy interventions on individual and organizational behavior 
and to contrast findings with predictions from theoretical models. Behavioral experiments 
therefore nicely complement and bridge non-experimental methods, in particular theory and 
empirical econometric analysis, and could therefore help bringing closer together the different 
health research communities (Galizzi, 2017; Galizzi, Harrison, and Miraldo, 2017). 
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Question 2: Are behavioral experiments really new to health economics, policy, and 
management? 
No. First, health economists are particularly well aware of the importance of using randomized 
controlled experiments. Modern evidence-based medicine and pharmacology are all based on 
randomized controlled trials (RCTs), starting from the pioneering work on scurvy by James 
Lind in 1747, to the first published RCT in medicine by Austin Bradford Hill and colleagues 
in 1948. Thanks to the ground-breaking contributions of Charles Sanders Peirce, Jerzy 
Neyman, Ronald A. Fisher and others, modern science has since long considered randomized 
controlled experiments as fundamental and important scientific methods. Far from novel, the 
idea of using randomized controlled experiments has been advocated for decades even for 
policy applications (Rubin, 1974; Ferber and Hirsch, 1978; Burtless, 1995).  
 
Second, arguably one of the most influential studies in health economics is indeed based on a 
large-scale randomized controlled experiment. The RAND Health Insurance Experiment 
conducted in the US between 1974 and 1982, in fact, analyzed the effects of randomly allocated 
co-payment rates and health insurance contracts on healthcare costs and utilization of 
healthcare (Newhouse, Manning, Morris, Orr, Duan, Keeler, Leibowitz, Marquis, Marquis, 
Phelps, and Brook, 1981; Manning, Newhouse, Duan, Keeler, Leibowitz, and Marquis, 1987). 
As a major finding, Joseph P. Newhouse and colleagues documented that cost sharing reduced 
the over-utilization of medical care while it did not significantly affect the quality of care 
received by participating patients.  
 
The spirit and the main features of the RAND Health Insurance Experiment has later inspired 
the design of the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment. The latter was conducted in 2008 with 
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uninsured low-income adults in Oregon. Adults allocated to the treatment group were given 
the chance to apply for Medicaid (via a lottery). This allowed researchers to analyze the effects 
of expanding access to public health insurance (Medicaid), for example, on the healthcare use 
and health of low-income adults. They found that the treatment group had substantively and 
statistically significantly higher healthcare utilization and a better self-reported health than the 
control group (Finkelstein, Taubman, Wright, Bernstein, Gruber, Newhouse, Allen, and 
Baicker, 2012; Finkelstein and Taubman, 2015).  
 
The launch of the Behavioural Experiments in Health Network (BEH-net) in 2015 can be seen 
as the response to a fast-increasing demand to systematically use behavioral experiments in 
health economics, policy, and management. The network aims precisely at integrating and 
bringing closer together the research communities at the interface between experimental and 
behavioral economics, and health economics.  
 
Question 3: What types of experiments are considered when referring to behavioral 
experiments in health? 
 
There is an important initial conceptual distinction between behavioral experiment in health 
and Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs). Many health practitioners and policy-makers, in 
fact, tend to automatically associate behavioral experiments with RCTs.  
 
In the health policy debate, the term RCT is sometimes used to denote large-scale field 
experiments conducted with entire organizations (e.g. hospitals, villages) without necessarily 
allowing the stakeholders in those organizations to explicitly express their views or their 
consent to the proposed manipulations. This is a major conceptual and practical difference with 
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respect to proper RCTs in medicine or pharmacology, where subjects are always explicitly 
asked to give informed consent prior to take part into RCTs, and allowed to drop out with 
important ethical, political, and logistical implications. The term RCT is therefore conceptually 
inappropriate and practically misleading in a health economics, policy, and management 
context, since it conveys the false impression that subjects have been made aware of being part 
of an experiment and have been consulted and given their consent to it, when actually this may 
not be the case. 
 
Moreover, even in the above narrow and inappropriate connotation, RCTs are only one specific 
type of experiment, namely field experiments. As mentioned, however, behavioral experiments 
in health purportedly cover the entire spectrum of experiments from the lab to the field. 
Harrison and List (2004) proposed an influential taxonomy of experiments along the lab-field 
spectrum that illustrates the diversity of experiments: i) conventional lab experiments involve 
student subjects, abstract framing, a lab context, and a set of imposed rules; ii) artefactual field 
experiments depart from conventional lab experiments in that they involve non-student 
samples; iii) framed field experiments add to artefactual field experiments a field context in the 
commodity, stakes, task or information; and, finally, iv) natural field experiments depart from 
framed field experiments in that subjects undertake the tasks in their natural environment, and 
subjects do not know that they take part into an experiment.  
 
The main idea behind natural field experiments is equivalent to von Heisenberg’s “uncertainty 
principle” in physics: the mere act of observation and measurement necessarily alters, to some 
extent, what is being observed and measured. In key areas for health economics, for example, 
there may be potential experimenter demand effects, where participants change behavior due 
to cues about what represents “appropriate” behavior for the experimenter (Levitt and List, 
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2007), for example, when deciding on provision of medical services; Hawthorne effects, where 
simply knowing they are part of a study makes participants feel important and improves their 
effort and performance (Levitt and List, 2011); and John Henry effects, where participants who 
perceive that they are in the control group exert greater effort because they treat the experiment 
like a competitive contest and they want to overcome the disadvantage of being in the control 
group (Cook and Campbell, 1979).  
 
More recently, other types of experiments have been conducted in experimental economics, 
beyond lab, artefactual field, frame field, and natural field experiments. For example, virtual 
experiments combine controlled experiments with virtual reality settings (Fiore, Harrison, 
Hughes and Rutström, 2009). While not yet applied to health economics contexts, virtual 
experiments are a promising approach to make tradeoffs more salient and vivid in health and 
healthcare decision-making.  
 
Lab-field experiments consist of a first-stage intervention under controlled conditions (in the 
lab) linked to a naturalistic situation (in the field) where subjects are not aware that their 
behavior is observed. Lab-field experiments have been used to look at the unintended 
“behavioral spillover” effects of health incentives (Dolan and Galizzi, 2014b; 2015; Dolan, 
Galizzi and Navarro-Martinez, 2015) or at the external validity of lab-based behavioral 
measures (Galizzi and Navarro-Martinez, 2017).  
 
Virtual experiments and lab-field experiments are part of the growing efforts to bridge the gap 
between the lab and the field in health economics applications (Hennig-Schmidt, Selten and 
Wiesen, 2011; Kesternich, Schumacher, Winter, 2015). They are also part of the more general 
“behavioral data linking” approach (Galizzi, Harrison, and Miraldo, 2017), that is, the linkage 
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of behavioral economics experiments with longitudinal surveys, administrative registers, 
biomarkers banks, apps, mobile devices, scan data, and other big data sources (Andersen, Cox, 
Harrison, Lau, Rutström and Sadiraj, 2015; Galizzi, Harrison and Miniaci, 2017). Data linkage 
poses new ethical, practical, and logistical challenges when it seeks to link surveys and 
behavioral experiments with health records and healthcare registers (Galizzi, Harrison, and 
Miraldo, 2017). Nonetheless, there is currently an extraordinary, and still largely untapped, 
potential to apply the experimental approach to an unprecedented host of health and healthcare 
contexts, and by linking and augmenting behavioral experiments in health with the very rich 
data sources available in health (see more in question 10).  
 
Taken together, there is not one type of experiment for potential health economics and policy 
purposes. Rather, the broad spectrum of different types of experiments spanning the lab to the 
field can prove useful and complementary for health applications, as well as the most recent 
online, mobile, and “behavioral data linking” experiments. 
 
Question 4: Is there a preferred type of behavioral experiment in health? 
There is currently no consensus on which specific type of behavioral experiment is superior. 
The choice of the specific type of experiment depends on the specific research question. Lab, 
field, online, mobile, and “behavioral data linking” experiments all have strengths and 
weaknesses, and their relative merits have been systematically discussed elsewhere (Smith, 
2002; Harrison and List, 2004; Guala, 2005; Levitt and List, 2007, 2009; Bardsley, Cubitt, 
Loomes, Moffatt, Starmer, and Sugden, 2009; Falk and Heckman, 2009; Harrison, 2013; 
Kagel, 2015).  
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For example, it is generally reckoned that lab experiments allow for high internal validity 
because of their ability to tightly control the environment and frame, minimize confounding 
factors, closely simulate conditions of theoretical models, and replicate past experiments. 
Furthermore, they provide insights into possible patterns prior to moving into the field, they 
uncover the mechanisms underlying decisions and behavior, and they require significantly 
fewer financial, time, and logistical resources than field experiments.  
 
On the other hand, it is generally reckoned that field experiments can enhance the external 
validity of experimental results (see more about this in question 5), because observations are 
made with subjects, environments, situations, tasks, rules and stakes which are closer to the 
ones occurring in the real world (Brookshire, Coursey, and Schulze, 1987; Galizzi and 
Navarro-Martinez, 2017). Field experiments, however, come with lesser control and with 
several other limitations when used for policy purposes (Harrison, 2014). Moreover, they are 
inherently more difficult to replicate. This is a major limitation given the increasing attention 
to the replicability of experimental results in economics, psychology, and health sciences 
(Burman, Reed, and Alm, 2010; Dolan and Galizzi, 2014a; Open Science Collaboration, 2015; 
Camerer, Dreber, Forsell, Ho, Huber, Johannesson, Kirchler, Almenberg, Altmejd, Chan, and 
Heikensten, 2016; Galizzi, Harrison, and Miraldo, 2017). 
 
More generally, it is important to reiterate the point that the different types of experiments are 
complementary not substitutes (Falk and Heckman, 2009; Harrison, Lau and Rutström, 2015; 
Galizzi, Harrison, and Miraldo, 2017). Recent behavioral experiments in health pick up on this 
important point and combine different types of experiments and thereby test for the validity of 
findings from lab experiments with conventional student samples. For example, Brosig-Koch, 
Hennig-Schmidt, Kairies-Schwarz, and Wiesen (2016a) combine lab and artefactual field 
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experiments to analyze the effect of fee-for-service and capitation regimes for medical service 
provision on the behaviors of medical students, non-medical students, and physicians. Across 
the board, they found that all subject pools responded to incentives similarly – namely, patients 
were over-treated under fee-for-service and undertreated under capitation. Physicians, 
however, responded less to the incentives inherent in these two payment schemes. In 
experiments with medical and non-medical students, Hennig-Schmidt and Wiesen (2014) and 
Brosig-Koch, Hennig-Schmidt, Kairies-Schwarz, and Wiesen (2017a) report similar findings. 
Wang, Iversen, Hennig-Schmidt, and Godager (2017) compare behavior of physicians and 
medical students in China and Germany. Comparing lab experimental data from medical 
students with artefactual field experimental data from a subsample of a representative sample 
of German resident physicians, Brosig-Koch, Hennig-Schmidt, Kairies-Schwarz, and Wiesen 
(2017b) find that performance pay crowds out patient-regarding motivation for both subject 
pools. 
 
Taken together, the experimental studies that systematically account for potential differences 
in the subject pools indicate that the direction of a treatment effect does not differ between 
(medical or non-medical) students and medical professionals. Importantly, however, the 
intensity of a behavioral effect might vary across subject pools. Moreover, experimental 
designs in health typically abstract from the complexity of real-world settings in order to 
“isolate” treatment effects. A few experimental studies even employ neutral framings of the 
decision situation presumably for reasons of control and salience of the incentives: see for 
example, Green (2014) on provider incentives; Huck, Lünser, Spitzer, and Tyran (2016) on 
health insurance choice; and Mimra, Rasch, and Waibel (2016) on specialists’ second opinions. 
As experiments are “scalable”, adding more realism (health context) to these settings by 
employing medical frames seem desirable: Ahlert, Felder, and Vogt (2012) and Kesternich, 
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Schumacher, and Winter (2015) find behavioral differences in the intensity of subjects’ 
responses when comparing neutral and medical frames.  
 
In sum, researchers and health care policy-makers alike might clearly need to be cautious in 
drawing conclusions to real world settings when taking findings from behavioral experiments 
in health at face value. One might argue, however, that this key point applies to any type of 
behavioral experiments in health, not just to lab experiments, or to field experiments. 
Moreover, the existing evidence indicates somewhat similar main directions of experimental 
treatment effects across subject pools and it is therefore useful to inform debates in healthcare 
policy and management. For a more general discussion of external validity and generalizability 
of experimental findings, see the next question. 
 
Question 5: Can we trust the external validity of behavioral experiments in health? 
 
The point on the external validity of behavioral experiments in health is too important to be 
unduly misrepresented or over-simplified as is oftentimes done in the research and policy 
debate. Most issues related to the external validity of experiments are actually not unique to 
behavioral experiments in health, but are common to all the economic experiments in general, 
and for this reason we answer this question more generally. 
 
The main observation is that external validity means different things from different points of 
view. In a first connotation, external validity refers to the within-subjects question of whether 
the outcomes of a behavioral experiment in health are representative of the corresponding 
outcomes of interest that would occur outside of the behavioral experiment for the same pool 
of subjects. From this perspective, as mentioned, external validity is often contrasted with 
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internal validity on the presumed ground that there is always an inherent trade-off between 
internal and external validity while one moves from the lab end to the field end of the spectrum 
in the Harrison and List (2004) taxonomy. This, however, is not always nor necessarily the 
case. In fact, to start with, if rigorously designed and conducted, all randomized controlled 
behavioral experiments in health are internally valid, whether they are lab, artefactual field, 
framed field, or natural field experiments. So, it is simply not true that internal validity is 
necessarily higher in lab than in natural field experiments. Moreover, it is also not true that the 
external validity (in the above explained connotation) is necessarily higher in natural field than 
in lab experiments. It obviously depends on how close is the correspondence between the 
outcomes measured in the behavioral experiment and the outcomes of interest that would occur 
outside of the behavioral experiments. In other words, it depends on what the final outcomes 
of interest are, and, ultimately, what the research question is. For example, imagine that the 
main outcomes of interest is about looking at how many calories subjects eat in a buffet, or 
how much time they wait until lighting up the next cigarette, which are both likely to be the 
outcomes of some automatic or “visceral” decision-making occurring without any conscious 
deliberation (Loewenstein, 1996). Then, a natural field experiment, where subjects do not know 
they are part of an experiment, would be a natural setting where to observe such behaviors 
(Dolan and Galizzi, 2014b). On the other hand, however, imagine that the main outcomes of 
interest is about studying how subjects trade-off and choose between different private health 
insurance schemes, or which groceries subjects purchase in an online supermarket, two highly 
deliberate decisions which are both likely to take place in online settings even when they occur 
outside of a behavioral experiment. Then, a conventional lab or an online experiment would be 
a natural setting where to observe such behaviors.    
 
19 
 
In a second, slightly different, connotation, external validity refers to the, still within-subjects, 
question of whether the outcomes of a behavioral experiment in health are good predictors of 
the corresponding outcomes of interest that would occur outside of the behavioral experiment 
for the same pool of subjects. For example, are healthy food choices in a behavioral experiment 
good predictors of a subject’s healthy diet? Are experimental decisions over drugs, treatments, 
health insurances good predictors of analogous decisions outside the experiment? It is true that, 
in principle, the experimental decisions can move closer to the decisions taken outside the 
experiment as one moves from lab experiments to natural field experiments in the Harrison and 
List (2004) taxonomy. But it is also true that this depends, again, on what the ultimate outcomes 
of interest and research questions are. And, in principle, also this type of external validity 
question can affect the entire spectrum of behavioral experiments in health, from lab to natural 
field experiments. In fact, the only rigorous strategy to empirically address this question is to 
design and implement a longitudinal augmentation of the original behavioral experiment that 
enables to follow up over time in more naturalistic settings the same pool of subjects. When 
implemented in a systematic and transparent way, this strategy also allows the researcher to 
overcome a major limitation of the very few external validity analyses to date, namely the fact 
that they typically are ad hoc analyses. The typical analysis, in fact, reports the correlation 
between one specific experimental outcome and one specific variable outside the experiment 
and, when such a correlation is found to be statistically significant, it concludes that what found 
in the experiment is externally valid. Such an approach, however, lacks of systematization 
because it fails to provide full information on the whole set of pairwise correlations between 
all the experimental outcomes and all the variables outside the experiment, being they 
significant or not significant. Only a systematic and transparent testing and reporting of all 
such correlations would be the litmus test of the external validity of a behavioral experiment. 
Such exercises are rare in experimental economics and virtually not existent in health.  
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In a non-health context, for example, Galizzi and Navarro-Martinez (2017) systematically 
assess and report the associations between the whole set of eight social preferences 
experimental games and five different pro-social variables outside of the experiment, and found 
that only one out of forty pairwise correlations is statistically significant (none is if properly 
correcting for multiple hypothesis testing). They then relate their finding to a systematic review 
and meta-analysis of all the, published and unpublished, studies that have previously tested the 
external validity of those same experimental games, and conclude that the often proclaimed 
external validity of social preferences games is not supported by the empirical evidence: only 
the 39.7% of the reported pairwise correlations and 37.5% of the reported regressions find a 
statistically significant association between an experimental outcome and a variable outside the 
experiment.  
 
The behavioral experiments in health literature still lacks a similar systematic and transparent 
approach to this dimension of the external validity question and, given the importance of this 
exercise for both research and policy purposes, we encourage more research in this direction 
(Galizzi, Machado, and Miniaci, 2016). For example, the lack of transparency and 
systematization is the main explanation behind the current sterile debate on whether lab-based 
behavioral economics measures for risk, time, and social preferences are externally valid in the 
health context. Very few studies in behavioral health economics have tied their hands by 
publishing a pre-analysis plan or a public protocol that clearly and explicitly states at the outset 
of the analysis which health behaviors in the field will be associated with the lab-based 
behavioral economics measures. Most studies only report ad hoc subsets of the correlations 
and regressions between those measures and the health behaviors, and do not report nor discuss 
how these results relate and compare to the whole set of statistically significant and not 
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significant associations. Moreover, systematic replication is almost inexistent in behavioral 
experiments in health. It is even argued by strong proponents of the lab experiments that 
preferences can only be measured in the lab. This is tantamount to state that the question of 
whether lab-based measures for those preferences are externally valid is a non-falsifiable 
question, which is the opposite of an evidence-based scientific approach to this key matter. If 
behavioral experiments in health are about to leave infancy for adulthood, they should better 
take seriously the lessons learned in the neighboring disciplines of medicine and health studies, 
where collective knowledge is systematically cumulated only through transparent replications, 
systematic reviews, and meta-analyses, as epitomized by major collective research 
infrastructures such as the Cochrane Collaboration or the Campbell Collaboration. 
 
A third connotation of the external validity has to do with whether the outcomes of a behavioral 
experiment in health are representative of the corresponding outcomes of the population of 
interest. This “out-of-sample” connotation of external validity clearly requires that the pool of 
subjects involved in the behavioral experiment in health has been drawn from a representative 
sample of the population of interest. So, for example, if the behavioral experiment aims at 
concluding something about decisions or behaviors of medical doctors, it should involve a 
representative sample of medical doctors, while if it aims at inferring anything at a population 
level, the behavioral experiment should involve a representative sample of the population.   
 
Moreover, the debate about the external validity of behavioral experiments in health should be 
more generally conducted within the broader framework of the debate in terms of 
generalizability — that is, the question of which other populations, settings, contexts or 
domains the findings from an experiment can be generalized to (Al-Ubaydli and List, 2015). 
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Importantly, the generalizability question equally applies to the whole spectrum of behavioral 
experiments in health, from lab to natural field experiments. 
 
There are three conceptually distinct threats to generalizability of behavioral experiments in 
health. The first threat comes essentially from participation bias. Unlike natural field 
experiments, lab, artefactual field, and framed field experiments recruit subjects through an 
explicit invitation to take part in an experiment. As a result, there is bias because subjects who 
choose to participate in experiments may be inherently different in their underlying 
characteristics from subjects who choose not to take part. Health researchers and policy-makers 
should therefore be aware that, because of the participation bias, even if the initial sample of 
subjects is indeed representative of the target student population, the resulting sub-sample of 
actual respondents may not be.  
 
The second threat comes from the fact that the environment, context, and frame of the 
experimental decisions and tasks in the lab may not be representative of real situations 
encountered by subjects in natural health and healthcare settings. This limitation can be easily 
overcome by redesigning tasks and contexts to more closely match naturalistic situations that 
subjects are more familiar with in real life — that is, to design framed field experiments in the 
sense of Harrison and List (2004). This strategy has been extensively employed in other 
application areas in experimental economics (e.g. Harrison, List, and Towe, 2007; Harrison 
and List, 2008), and has already been explored in the health economics area (e.g. Hennig-
Schmidt, Selten, and Wiesen, 2011; Hennig-Schmidt and Wiesen, 2014; Galizzi, Miraldo, 
Stavropoulou, and van der Pol, 2016; Eilermann, Halstenberg, Kuntz, Martakis, Roth, and 
Wiesen, 2017). 
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The last threat to generalizability is that experimental subjects may not be representative of the 
general population, especially when are students or medical students (Levitt and List, 2007). 
To overcome this limitation, behavioral economists have started running artefactual field 
experiments with representative samples of the population (Harrison, Lau and Rutström, 2002, 
2007; Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström, 2008a, 2014; Galizzi, Machado, and Miniaci, 
2016; Galizzi, Harrison and Miniaci, 2017). This is a promising avenue for behavioral 
experiments in health, given that the goals and priorities in designing health policies and health 
systems are typically set at a population level (Michie, 2008). 
From the broader generalizability perspective, we can hardly see why the results of a natural 
field experiment with, say, female nurses in Tanzania, or health insurance customers in the 
rural Philippines should be considered as more generalizable than a lab experiment with 
medical students in Germany, or an artefactual field experiment with a representative sample 
of the population in the UK. Too often similar claims even forget to state what the population 
of interest is for the study.  
More generally, Falk and Heckman (2009) state that causal knowledge requires a controlled 
variation. Whether a variation from, for example, a natural field experiment or a more 
controlled lab experiment is more informative depends on the research question and is still 
debated among researchers in social sciences. It is important to acknowledge, again, that 
empirical methods and different sources of data are complements. For example, both 
behavioral experiments, spanning the lab to the field, and econometric analyses of secondary 
data can all improve the state of knowledge in health economics research, with the issue of 
generalizability of results being applicable to all of them. 
Taken together, behavioral and experimental health economists should take seriously the 
external validity and generalizability challenges by open-mindedly using all types of 
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experiments in the lab-field spectrum, by embracing a transparent and systematic approach in 
gathering and reporting evidence, including reporting of all the statistically significant and not 
significant correlations and regressions (rather than cherry-picked subsets of the positive 
results). We see this as a fundamental requisite for behavioral experiments in health as a field 
moving, in the years to come, from infancy to adulthood. 
 
Question 6: What about experiments to elicit preferences in health? 
 
One of the above-discussed defining features of behavioral experiments in health is that they 
entail directly observable and measurable behavioral responses. For example, experimental 
decisions, tasks, and measures to elicit preferences and willingness-to-pay are incentive-
compatible in the sense that subjects pay some real consequence in terms of monetary or non-
monetary outcomes for the choices they make. This raises the question of whether or not 
behavioral experiments in health also include the experimental studies that aim at eliciting 
health-related preferences. 
 
Some distinctions should be made on this point. On the one hand, there is a vast literature in 
health economics that uses popular experimental methods such as the Standard Gamble (SG) 
or the Time Trade Off (TTO) to elicit preferences for hypothetical health states (Bleichrodt and 
Johannesson, 2001; Bleichrodt, 2002; Attema and Brouwer, 2012). Given the hypothetical 
nature of the choices about different health states, these experiments are similar in nature to the 
already discussed “stated preference experiments”, such as contingent valuation studies or 
“discrete choice experiments” (DCEs), which do not typically consider real behavior or 
incentive-compatible choice situations. Using the same argument, therefore, the experiments 
in this literature should not be considered behavioral experiments in health. 
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On the other hand, there is also a small, but growing, literature looking at the relationships 
between incentive-compatible experimental measures of risk and time preferences and health-
related behaviors. Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2010), for example, elicit risk and time 
preferences of a representative sample of the Danish population and find no difference in the 
likelihood of smokers and non-smokers to exhibit hyperbolic discounting, no significant 
association of smoking with risk aversion among men, and no significant association of 
smoking with discount rates among women. Galizzi and Miraldo (2017) measure the risk 
preferences of a convenience sample of students and find that, while there is no association 
between smoking or BMI with the estimated risk aversion, the latter is significantly associated 
with the Healthy Eating Index, an indicator of overall nutritional quality. Harrison, Hofmeyr, 
Ross and Swarthout (2015) elicit risk and time preferences of a convenience sample of students 
at the University of Cape Town, and find that smokers and non-smokers differ in their baseline 
discount rates, but do not significantly differ in their present bias, risk aversion, or subjective 
perception of probabilities. In a longitudinal experiment with a representative sample of the 
UK population, Galizzi, Machado, and Miniaci (2016) systematically assess the external 
validity of different measures of risk preferences linked to the UK Longitudinal Household 
Survey (UKHLS), and find that the experimental measures are not significantly associated to 
subjects‘ BMI, eating, smoking, or drinking habits. Several other ad hoc analyses have 
associated risk and time preferences with heavy drinking (Anderson and Mellor, 2008), BMI 
(Sutter, Kocher, Glätzle-Rützler, and Trautmann, 2013), and the uptake of vaccinations, 
preventive care, and medical tests (Chapman and Coups, 1999; Bradford, 2010; Bradford, 
Zoller and Silvestri, 2010).  
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Given that all these latter experiments use incentive-compatible methods to elicit risk and time 
preferences, they should be considered as behavioral experiments in health. A common aspect 
of the latter group of experiments, however, is that they measure individual risk and time 
preferences over (risky or inter-temporal) monetary outcomes, and then link these to health-
related behaviors. But what about the studies that elicit individual risk and time preferences for 
health outcomes, rather than for monetary outcomes?  
 
We see the experiments eliciting risk and time preferences in health as an interesting middle 
ground between stated preferences experiments and behavioral experiments. When it comes to 
the measurement of risk and time preferences in the health domain, in fact, the current 
community of behavioral health experimentalists interprets behavioral experiments in health 
with a fair degree of tolerance, flexibility, and open-mindedness, and considers the elicitation 
of risk and time preferences in health a research field that is closely aligned with, and affine to, 
the core interests and methods of behavioral experiments in health.  
 
This is not because the community disagrees with the traditional experimental economics view 
that answers to hypothetical questions can significantly differ from responses to incentive-
compatible tests because “talk is cheap” if there are no real behavioral consequences (Battalio, 
Kagel and Jiranyakul, 1990; Cummings, Harrison and Rutström, 1995; Cummings, Elliott, 
Harrison and Murphy, 1997; Holt and Laury, 2002; Harrison, 2006). Moreover, behavioral 
health experimentalists are all well aware that, from a theoretical perspective, risk and time 
preferences are fundamental individual characteristics at the core of health behavior and 
decision-making (Gafni and Torrance, 1984). Risk and time preferences, in fact, directly 
inform the principles and practices of cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) and cost-utility 
analysis (CUA) in healthcare, and the assumptions beyond the Quality Adjusted Life Years 
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(QALY), the measure of health benefits that is commonly employed in CEA and CUA, and 
that relies on the above mentioned SG and TTO methods (Bleichrodt, Wakker and 
Johannesson, 1997).  
 
Rather, it is because at the moment the literature on behavioral experiments in health lacks a 
systematic body of state-of-the-art consensus methods to measure health-related preferences 
with real non-monetary consequences. Given the fundamental role of risk and time preferences 
in the health context, it is actually surprising that there is no consensus to date on a “gold 
standard” measurement methodology.  
 
A multitude of different methods have been proposed to measure risk and time preferences in 
health contexts, which are heterogeneous in terms of underlying theoretical frameworks, 
methodological features, and links to formal econometric analysis (Galizzi, Harrison, and 
Miraldo, 2017). A major challenge in converging to a consensus methodology to measure risk 
and time preferences in health is related to the fact that, to date, the different proposed methods 
are substantially disconnected. On the one hand, the current methods to measure preferences 
for health outcomes only entail hypothetical scenarios. On the other hand, all the incentive-
compatible methods to measure preferences with real consequences are based on monetary 
outcomes. From both a conceptual and an empirical point of view, however, it is unclear 
whether individual risk and time preferences are stable across the health and the monetary 
domains (Chapman, 1996).  
 
There have been a number of exploratory analyses of whether these preferences are indeed 
stable across the finance and the health domains. Galizzi, Miraldo and Stavropoulou (2016), 
for example, summarize the relatively limited number of studies that compare risk taking across 
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the health and other domains, and find that, despite the broad heterogeneity of methods and 
frames used in the literature, there is general evidence that there are differences across domains, 
and that these differences also emerge when real consequences are at stake.  
 
The elicitation of risk and time preferences with incentive-compatible methods in the health 
domain is a promising and challenging task, and a collective priority in the research agenda of 
behavioral experimentalists in health. We expect this methodological and substantial gap to be 
filled soon by the increasingly collaborative community of behavioral experimentalists in 
health.  
 
Question 7: Which topics are addressed by behavioral experiments in health? 
 
A first area of experimental research that has recently received considerable attention are 
“nudges”, that is, changes in the “choice architecture” made to induce changes in health 
behavior, mainly at an unconscious or automatic level (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). In the spirit 
of “asymmetric paternalism” (Loewenstein, Brennan, and Volpp, 2007; Loewenstein, Ash, and 
Volpp, 2013), many behavioral experiments have in fact applied nudges to health and 
healthcare behavior spanning from risky behaviors in adolescents (Clark and Loheac, 2007) to 
exercise (Calzolari and Nardotto, 2016), from food choices (Schwartz, Riis, Elbel, and Ariely, 
2012; Schwartz, Mochon, Wyper, Maroba, Patel, and Ariely, 2014; Milkman, Minson, and 
Volpp, 2014; VanEpps, Downs, and Loewenstein, 2016a,b) to drugs compliance (Vervloet et 
al. 2012), from medical decision making (Schwartz and Chapman, 1999; Brewer, Chapman, 
Schwartz, and Bergus, 2007; Ansher, Ariely, Nagler, Rudd, Schwartz, and Sha et, 2014) to 
dentists’ services (Altman and Traxler, 2014). 
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There is, however, much more in behavioral experiments in health than just nudging (Galizzi, 
Harrison, and Miraldo, 2017; Oliver, 2017). Behavioral experiments in health can, in fact, 
uncover the behavioral mechanisms beyond the change in health behavior, and thus inform the 
design and the implementation of a series of other types of health policies including 
informational campaigns, salient labeling and packaging of healthy food items, the use of 
financial and non-financial incentives, the design of effective tax, subsidy, health insurance 
plans, and regulatory schemes (Galizzi, 2014, 2017).  
 
In fact, a broad spectrum of lab to natural field experiments have already been applied to a 
variety of health economics, policy, and management areas, well beyond “nudges.” For 
example, behavioral experiments in health have investigated the effects of different co-
payment rates and health insurance contracts on healthcare utilization and costs (Newhouse, 
Manning, Morris, Orr, Duan, Keeler, Leibowitz, Marquis, Marquis, Phelps, and Brook, 1981; 
Manning, Newhouse, Duan, Keeler, Leibowitz, and Marquis, 1987); the effects of public health 
insurance coverage on healthcare utilization and health outcomes (Finkelstein, Taubman, 
Wright, Bernstein, Gruber, Newhouse, Allen, and Baicker, 2012; Baicker, Taubman, Allen, 
Bernstein, Gruber, Newhouse, Schneider, Wright, Zaslavzky, and Finkelstein, 2013; 
Finkelstein and Taubman, 2015; Finkelstein, Taubman, Allen, Wright, and Baicker, 2016); the 
effects of different providers’ incentives and the role of altruism (Fan, Chen, and Kann, 1998; 
Hennig-Schmidt, Selten and Wiesen, 2011; Alhert, Felder, and Vogt, 2012; Godager and 
Wiesen, 2013; Green, 2014; Hennig-Schmidt and Wiesen, 2014; Kesternich, Schumacher and 
Winter, 2015; Brosig-Koch, Hennig-Schmidt, Kairies-Schwarz and Wiesen, 2016a, 2016b, 
2017a, 2017b; Kokot, Brosig-Koch and Kairies-Schwarz, 2017); the role of audit, 
transparency, compliance, and gender bias in healthcare management (Godager, Hennig-
Schmidt and Iversen, 2016; Jakobsson, Kotsadam, Syse, and Øien, 2016; Hennig-Schmidt, 
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Jürges, and Wiesen, 2017; Lindeboom, van der Klaauw, and Vriend, 2017); the role of different 
healthcare financing policies (Buckley, Cuff, Hurley, McLeod, Mestelman, and Cameron, 
2012, 2015, 2016); two-part tariffs for physician services (Greiner, Zhang and Tang, 2017); 
provider competition (Brosig-Koch, Hehenkamp and Kokot, 2017; Kairies-Schwarz, Han, and 
Vomhof, 2017) the matching markets for organ donations and for physicians and healthcare 
professionals (Roth, 2002; Roth and Peranson, 1999; Kessler and Roth, 2012; Kessler and 
Roth, 2014a,b; Herr and Normann, 2016; Li, Hawley and Schnier, 2013); the role of subsidies 
for diagnostic tests and new health products (Dupas, 2014a,b; Cohen, Dupas, and Schaner, 
2015; Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer, 2015; Dupas, Hoffman, Kremer, and Zwane, 2016); the 
choice of health insurance (Schram and Sonnemans, 2011; Buckley, Cuff, Hurley, McLeod, 
Nuscheler, and Cameron, 2012; Kesternich, Heiss, McFadden and Winter, 2013; Huck, Lünser, 
Spitzer, and Tyran, 2016; Kairies-Schwarz, Kokot, Vomhof, and Weßling, 2017); the economic 
and behavioral determinants of vaccination (Milkman, Beshears, Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 
2011; Tsutsui, Benzion, & Shahrabani, 2012; Bronchetti, Huffman, and Magenheim, 2015; 
Massin, Ventelou, Nebout, Verger, and Pulcini, 2015; Böhm, Betsch, and Korn, 2016; Böhm, 
Meier, Lars Korn, Betsch, 2017; Binder and Nuscheler, 2017); the effects of different types of 
HIV risk information and of SMS interventions on HIV treatment adherence (Dupas, 2011; 
Rana, Haberer, Huang, Kambugu, Mukasa, Trirumurthy, Wabukala, and Linnemayr, 2015); 
the use of financial incentives for smoking cessation (Volpp et al., 2006, 2009; Gine’, Karlan, 
and Zinman, 2010; Halpern, French, Small, Sausgiver, Harhay, Audran-McGovern, 
Loewenstein, Brennan, Asch, and Volpp, 2015; Halpern, French, Small, Sausgiver, Harhay, 
Audran-McGovern, Loewenstein, Asch, and Volpp, 2016), physical exercise (Charness and 
Gneezy, 2009; Royer, Stehr, and Sydnor, 2015), weight loss (Volpp, John, Troxel, Norton, 
Fassbender, and Loewenstein, 2008; John, Loewenstein, Troxel, Norton, Fassbender, and 
Volpp, 2011; Rao, Krall, and Loewenstein, 2011; John, Loewenstein, and Volpp, 2012; 
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Kullgren, Troxel, Loewenstein, Asch, Norton, Wesby, Tao, Zhu, and Volpp, 2013; Kullgren, 
Troxel, Loewenstein, Norton, Gatto, Tao, Zhu, Schofield, Shea, Asch, Pellathy, Driggers, and 
Volpp, 2016), healthy eating (Loewenstein, Price, and Vopp, 2016), warfarin adherence 
(Volpp, Loewenstein, Troxel, Doshi, Price, Laskin, and Kimmel, 2008; Kimmel, Troxel, 
Loewenstein, Brensinger, Jaskowiak, Doshi, Laskin, and Volpp, 2012; Kimmel, Troxel, 
French, Loewenstein, Brensinger, Meussner, Doshi, Laskin, and Volpp, 2016), glucose control 
(Long, Jahnle, Richardson, Loewenstein, and Volpp, 2012), home-based health monitoring 
(Sen, Sewell, Riley, Stearman, Bellamy, Hu, Park, Yao, Zhu, Loewenstein, Asch, and Volpp, 
2014), mental exercises (Schofield, Loewenstein, Kopisc, and Volpp, 2015), immunization 
coverage (Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, and Kothari, 2010), nursing services (Banejee, Duflo, 
and Glennerster, 2007), and medical drugs (Samper and Schwartz, 2013); the unintended 
carryover and spillover effects of financial incentives and nudges in health (Muller et al., 2009; 
Wisdom, Downs, and Loewenstein, 2010; Chiou, Yang, Wan, 2011; Dolan and Galizzi, 2014, 
2015; Dolan, Galizzi, and Navarro-Martinez, 2015); the behavioral effect of decision support 
systems and feedback (Cox, Sadiraj, Schnier, and Sweeney, 2016a; Eilermann, Halstenberg, 
Kuntz, Martakis, Roth, and Wiesen 2017); the elicitation of risk and time preferences in health 
and their links with health-related behaviors (Cairns, 1994; Cairns and Van der Pol, 1997; 
Chapman and Elstein, 1995; Dolan and Gudex, 1995; Chapman. 1996; Allison, Kiefe, Cooke, 
Gerrity, Oray, and Centor, 1998; Chapman and Coup, 1999; Van der Pol and Cairns, 1999, 
2001, 2002, 2008, 2011; Bleichrodt and Johannesson, 2001; Anderson and Mellor, 2008; 
Attema and Brouwer, 2010, 2012, 2014; Bradford, 2010; Bradford, Zoller, and Silvestri, 2010; 
Harrison, Lau and Rutström, 2010; Attema, 2012; Attema, Bleichrodt, and Wakker, 2012;  
Szrek, Chao, Ramlagan, and Peltzer, 2012; Attema and Versteegh, 2013; Michel-Lepage, 
Ventelou, Nebout, Verger, and Pulcini, 2013; Sutter, Kocher, Glätzle-Rützler, and Trautmann, 
2013; Harrison, Hofmeyr, Ross and Swarthout, 2015; Galizzi, Machado and Miniaci, 2016; 
32 
 
Galizzi, Miraldo, Stavropoulou, 2016; Galizzi, Miraldo, Stavropoulou, and van der Pol, 2016; 
Galizzi and Miraldo, 2017; Garcia Prado, Arrieta, Gonzalez, and Pinto Prades, 2017); the 
elicitation of preferences for retransplantation (Ubel and Loewenstein, 1995), and end-of-life 
decisions (Halpern, Loewenstein, Volpp, Cooney, Vranas, Quill, McKenzie, Harhay, Gabler, 
Silva, Arnold, Angus, and Bryce, 2013).  
 
Nudges are just one of the many areas of applications. They tend to be relatively effective in 
the health contexts where people suffer from “internalities”, costs that we incur in because we 
fail to account for our future selves (Herrnstein, Loewenstein, Prelec, and Vaughan, 1993). 
Many other health situations are, however, also affected by externalities. Other policy tools, 
such as taxes, subsidies, and regulatory interventions, have been documented to deal effectively 
with externalities in health markets (Bhargava and Loewenstein, 2015; Galizzi, 2017). The 
application of behavioral experiments to these policy areas is at the moment almost inexistent, 
and we foresee an increase of applications in this key area. 
 
Another related aspect for both research and policy purposes is concerned about the rationale 
informing the legitimacy of nudging people. There is a major gap in the literature in measuring 
the underlying preferences before the nudging interventions take place, and in monitoring their 
evolution (if any) before and after being nudged. This would help understanding heterogeneity 
in behavioral change, as well as identifying the behavioral channels, mechanisms, and 
mediating factors that are activated when individuals’ behavior is nudged. At the same time, it 
would inform the design of target-specific nudges, incentives, and behavioral regulatory tools 
(thus advancing the state-of-the-art evidence beyond knowing just “what works”). The issue of 
which set of preferences should be considered for drawing a welfare analysis of nudges and 
other behavioral interventions is one of the most relevant and pressing open questions from 
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both a conceptual and an empirical perspective, as well as another area of promising 
development for the next waves of behavioral experiments in health.  
 
Question 8: How do framing and subject pool matter in behavioral experiments in health 
when analyzing healthcare professionals’ behavior?  
 
While a neutral framing of the experimental decision is appropriate in an experiment on 
decision-making in games of strategic interactions, a medical framing appears natural for 
behavioral experiments on decision-making in medical contexts. Kesternich, Schumacher, and 
Winter (2015) show that framing in a health context affects subjects’ behavior in modified 
dictator and trilateral distribution games. In particular, in their health frame subjects decide in 
the role of physicians on the provision of medical services with consequences for real patients 
outside the lab (similar to Hennig-Schmidt, Selten, and Wiesen 2011) in the modified dictator 
game, whereas in a trilateral distribution game consequences for the insured bearing the cost 
of medical service provision are also added. 
 
More generally, recent practice in behavioral experiments in health is aligned with the belief 
that unless you frame a decision situation – for example in a medical or health frame – a 
researcher cannot be sure how subjects in an experiment have perceived the decision situation 
(Harrison and List, 2008; Galizzi and Navarro-Martinez, 2017). It may thus be crucial in chosen 
effort tasks to set subjects in the context the experimenter wants to study in order to avoid the 
possibility that subjects may impose a context on the abstract experimental task that is different 
from the experimenter's intended context (e.g., Harrison and List, 2004; Engel and Rand, 2014). 
As Harrison and List (2004) notice, “it is not the case that abstract, context-free experiments 
provide more general findings if the context itself is relevant to the performance of the subjects” 
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(p. 1022). 
 
It remains unclear however, whether a change in behavior due to framing more or less 
accurately reflects true behavior of healthcare professionals. One may argue that a healthcare 
professional in a health-framed study may be more willing to forgo earnings to avoid looking 
bad (“experimenter demand effect”, Zizzo, 2010). In practice, healthcare professionals in a 
neutrally framed decision situation could even become less responsive to how choices directly 
affect patients than when facing a series of choices in a framed task. Further, individuals may 
value their health and the health of others differently than any other good. Therefore, both 
unframed and framed experiments may misinterpret choices by healthcare professionals. For 
these reasons, it is important to study whether a medical framing in experiments more 
accurately reflects behavior in healthcare delivery (Kesternich, Schumacher, and Winter, 2015; 
Cox, Green, and Hennig-Schmidt, 2016b).   
 
Further, different subject pools used in health-related experiments (non-medical students, 
medical students, physicians) may significantly change behavioral results, with non-medical 
students exerting less patient-regarding altruism (Hennig-Schmidt and Wiesen, 2014; Brosig-
Koch, Hennig-Schmidt, Kairies-Schwarz, and Wiesen, 2017a). Considering fraudulent 
behavior in a routine task in neonatal intensive care units (entry of weights in the birth reports), 
Hennig-Schmidt, Jürges, and Wiesen (2017) found some evidence for more honest behavior of 
medical students compared to economics students. A few studies with healthcare professionals 
and medical students in developing countries correlate neutrally-framed social preferences with 
actual health-related behaviors (e.g., Kolstad and Lindkvist, 2012; Brock, Lange, and 
Leonhard, 2014). 
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Taken together, three promising avenue for behavioral experiments in health on this issue are 
(i) rigorously and systematically testing the behavioral effects of framing and subject pools; 
(ii) extending initial findings from the laboratory to field experiments, ideally with healthcare 
professionals (Cox, Sadiraj, Schnier, and Sweeney, 2016a; Eilermann, Halstenberg, Kuntz, 
Martakis, Roth, and Wiesen 2017; Leeds, Sadiraj, Cox, Gao, Pawlik, Schnier, and Sweeney, 
2017); and (iii) linking findings from behavioral experiments to actual health-related behaviors. 
In this sense, it seems thus appropriate to call, again, for more systematic evidence – also from 
healthcare systems in developed countries – to be able to gather more conclusive predictions 
of providers’ behavior in the field.   
 
Question 9: Is health really different from other policy domains? 
 
The specificity of health as a policy domain is self-evident. On the one hand, health is a very 
special area of policy application for obvious ethical and political reasons, and even more so 
for the application of randomized controlled behavioral experiments. Health, moreover, is a 
research and policy area that is uniquely rich in data: think about the millions of yearly entries 
in healthcare records and administrative registers (e.g. the Health Episodes Statistics in the 
UK); the large epidemiological cohorts and clinical randomized controlled trials; the complex 
databanks containing the genetic and epigenetic profiling at a population level. It is also unclear 
from both a conceptual and an empirical point of view whether behaviors and decisions in the 
health domain merely reflect behaviors and decisions in other domains in life, for example in 
the financial domain. As mentioned, the small experimental literature on cross-domains 
preferences seems to suggest that preferences are not stable across the health and the monetary 
domains. Also the literature on the use of financial incentives in health finds that their effects 
are less straightforward and universally applicable than in other fields of applications (Gneezy, 
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Meier, and Rey-Biel, 2011). A more specific example is about health care provider incentives. 
Recent experimental findings suggest that health care providers’ behavior seems to be affected 
by pay for performance pay, but that this might also lead to adverse effects such as motivation 
crowding-out (e.g., Brosig-Koch, Hennig-Schmidt, Kairies-Schwarz, and Wiesen 2016a, 
2017b, Oxholm, 2016). The latter pattern is, for example, not observed in other working 
domains (admittedly with different performance schemes), such as in field experiments with 
teachers (e.g., Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2011). Therefore, a note of caution should be 
in order when extrapolating lessons from experiments in other fields and to generalize them to 
the health domain.  
 
On the other hand, behavioral health economists should be careful in advocating a complete 
disconnection of health applications from other areas of application of behavioral and 
experimental economics. On the contrary they should continue arguing that there is much that 
can be learned from health applications, which is useful to other policy domains. This can also 
help to reduce the substantial disengagement between economic and medical journals. For 
example, generalist economic journals seem to regularly publish behavioral experiments in, for 
example, education, financial savings, energy consumption more regularly than in health, 
which are sometimes dismissed as “too field-specific”. That health is of more, not less, general 
interest than other sub-fields of economics is directly confirmed by the stellar impact factor 
and international reputation and visibility of the medical journals. 
 
Question 10: What can behavioral experiments in health tell us about long-term effects? 
 
It is true that, at the moment, there is very little evidence on the long-term carryover effects 
and on the cross-behavioral spillover effects of nudges, incentives, and other health policy 
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interventions (Dolan and Galizzi, 2014a, 2015; Dolan, Galizzi, and Navarro-Martinez, 2015). 
This is also due to the fact that, in practice, it is difficult to design behavioral experiments that 
follow up subjects over time for periods of time longer than a couple of hours (in the lab) or a 
few weeks or months (in the field), or that track all the complex ramifications of an initial 
policy intervention on the whole set of targeted and non-targeted health behaviors.  
 
There is, more generally, a sort of major gap and disconnection between two key sources of 
empirical evidence in health economics. On the one hand, the behavioral experiments in health 
are typically conducted with small samples of subjects and almost invariably centered around 
a single observation window or a single data collection point. On the other hand, very 
comprehensive longitudinal datasets exist in health in forms of administrative records for 
healthcare access (e.g. the Health Episodes Statistics in the UK), biomarkers banks (e.g., the 
UK BioBank in the UK), or medical records and biomarkers for epidemiological cohorts (e.g., 
Constances in France).  
 
The time seems ripe to systematically link and integrate these two major data sources. The 
already mentioned recent spring of experiments on “behavioral data linking” has showed that 
it is indeed feasible to link and merge behavioral economics experiments with other data 
sources such as longitudinal surveys, online panels, administrative records, biomarkers and 
epigenetics banks, apps and mobile devices, smart cards and scan data, clinical randomized 
controlled trials, and other big data sources (Andersen, Cox, Harrison, Lau, Rutström and 
Sadiraj, 2015; Galizzi, Harrison and Miniaci, 2017). Given the inherent data-richness of health 
as a research and policy domain, we expect behavioral data linking to become a key building 
block of the next generation of behavioral experiments in health. This will contribute to further 
integrate and cross-fertilize insights, tools, and methods from behavioral, experimental, and 
38 
 
health economics, and to shape up a ground-breaking inter-disciplinary area at the interface 
between behavioral, medical, and data sciences. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this article, we have reviewed the state of the art of behavioral experiments in health by 
critically discussing ten key areas of potential debate and misconception, by highlighting their 
theoretical and empirical rationale and scope, and by discussing the significant questions which 
remain.  
 
As our discussions indicate, there are many areas within health economics where experimental 
methods can be applied fruitfully. To date, in fact, a broad spectrum of behavioral experiments 
from the lab to the field have already been applied to numerous different health-related areas 
including, for example, the effects of different co-payment rates and health insurance contracts 
on healthcare utilization and costs; the effects of public health insurance coverage on healthcare 
utilization and health outcomes; the effects of different providers’ incentives and the role of 
altruism; the role of audit, transparency, compliance, and gender bias in healthcare 
management; the role of different healthcare financing policies; the matching markets for organ 
donations and for physicians and healthcare professionals; the role of subsidies for diagnostic 
tests and new health products; the choice of health insurance; the economic and behavioral 
determinants of vaccination; the effects of different types of HIV risk information and of SMS 
interventions on HIV treatment adherence; the use of financial incentives and nudges for 
smoking cessation, physical exercise, weight loss, healthy eating, warfarin adherence, glucose 
control, home-based health monitoring, mental exercises, immunization coverage, and medical 
drugs; the unintended carryover and spillover effects of financial incentives and nudges in 
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health; the behavioral effect of decision support systems and feedback; the elicitation of risk 
and time preferences in health and their links with health-related behaviors; the elicitation of 
preferences for re-transplantation and end-of-life decisions. Many other health-related areas 
are expected to follow in the next years in both developing and developed countries. 
 
Tailoring and fine-tuning the broad spectrum of lab, field, online, mobile, and “behavioral data 
linking” experiments in order to address pressing health policy challenges and key research 
questions is, both methodologically and substantially, one of the most promising and exciting 
areas of applications of behavioral experiments to health economics. Also via the new 
international networks, the next cohort of behavioral experiments in health is likely to originate 
from a closer collaboration among behavioral and experimental economists, health economists, 
medical doctors, and decision-makers in health policy and management. This forthcoming 
generation of behavioral experiments in health will likely scale up the current endeavors to 
systematically link behavioral economics measures to other data sources, data of which health 
is naturally rich. In the next years to come, the promise and the research and policy impact of 
behavioral experiments in health is only destined to grow.  
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